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Abstract
Using a structural model of demand for automobile engine vari-
ants, this paper finds that there is second-degree price discrimina-
tion: markups increase with engine size. Still, average markups are
lower than when models have just one engine. The paper develops the
first empirical demand framework suitable for markets with variants.
There is an unobserved product characteristic and a consumer-specific
logit term for classes of products, but both are fixed across variants.
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1 Introduction
It is a widespread practice for firms to offer different qualities of what are oth-
erwise the same products. iPhone 3GS has 16GB and 32GB storage variants.
Internet service providers offer a choice of bandwidths. Airlines and trains
have different travel classes. Car models come with several engine options.
The existence of quality variants is often explained by price discrimination.
In an early mention of the issue, Dupuit (1849) points out that railway com-
panies let their third-class accommodation be “open carriages with wooden
benches (. . . ) to prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare
from traveling third-class”.1 Low-price variants have lower quality, so that
consumers with higher willingness to pay will self-select into higher qualities.
Mussa and Rosen (1978) show that a monopolist can charge higher markups
by sorting consumers in this way.
More recent theories extend the basic monopoly model to include compe-
tition. Take a duopoly with horizontally differentiated firms, each offering
two qualities. Markups are positive, because each firm has a comparative
advantage in its horizontal location. But firms have no comparative advan-
tage in supplying quality. Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and
Stole (2002) show that depending on the intensity of competition firms may
no longer discriminate and instead charge the same markups for both quali-
ties.2 Let the duopolists play a game were they can offer one or two qualities.
Offering two qualities may enable a firm to price discriminate. But it also in-
creases competition, by moving closer to the preferences of some of the other
firm’s customers.3 In this way, the outcome (‘one’,‘one’) may have higher
profits than (‘two’,‘two’). Furthermore, if ‘two’ is a dominant strategy, the
game is a prisoner’s dilemma. In this case we will observe quality variants
1Quoted by Tirole (1988).
2Verboven (1999) finds constant markups for any intensity of competition. See discus-
sion in Stole (2007) pp. 2274-6.
3This is particularly clear if firm A’s actions are to offer either low quality or both and
firm B’s to offer either high or both.
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and discrimination, but firms would be better off if they could commit to
restrict quality ranges.4
The theoretical models provide useful benchmark results. But the results de-
pend on specific assumptions (the degree of differentiation, symmetry). To
understand quality-based price discrimination, it is therefore useful to let the
data determine these specifics. This paper is an empirical study of the central
questions from the theory literature discussed in the previous paragraph: is
there quality-based price discrimination, and do the gains from discrimina-
tion outweigh the cost of increased competition at the industry level? The
contribution of the paper is to address these questions by developing and
estimating a new structural demand framework that is the first to accommo-
date quality variants, and to have the relevant theory models as special cases.
The new demand model is a natural extension of existing empirical models,
along the lines of the theoretical models. It has broad applications, in that
it is suitable for horizontally differentiated and quantity variants as well as
quality variants (e.g. fat levels of a milk brand, or small and large boxes of
breakfast cereal). In particular, I ask whether there is price discrimination
across automobile engine variants, and whether industry profits would be
higher if car models had only one engine variant.
My results show that there is discrimination, but that it is not sufficient to
raise average markups relative to a situation where car models have only one
engine size. Markups are computed using a standard equilibrium assumption.
Within car models, markups increase in engine size. In a counterfactual
equilibrium where car models are restricted to have only one engine variant,
average markups are slightly higher than in the multi-variant case. The
benefits of discrimination do not offset the increase in competition from a
large number of variants. Profits still rise slightly, however, since total sales
go up because of increased product variety.
4See Gilbert and Matutes (1993) for this prisoner’s dilemma. Ellison (2005) pp. 596-7
finds that both restricted and full quality ranges may be equilibria. Corts (1998) finds
a similar prisoner’s dilemma result for third-degree price discrimination: discriminating
may be a dominant strategy leading to lower equilibrium profits than uniform pricing.
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A natural point of departure for a demand model is the differentiated-products
demand literature starting with Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) (BLP).
The utility a consumer gets from a product is a linear function of observable
product characteristics. In addition, a product-specific constant captures
unobserved product characteristics that affect consumers in the same way.
Finally, utility includes a random shock that is iid across products for a given
consumer, and across consumers. The shock represents likes and dislikes that
are idiosyncratic in the sense that they are not correlated across products.
These assumptions are not entirely appropriate for markets with variants.
My demand framework is designed to accommodate the fact that quality
variants of products differ only with respect to observable characteristics
(e.g. horsepower or hard-drive storage). The effect of observable product
characteristics is fully accounted for by directly including these characteristics
in the utility function. Since variants differ only by observable characteristics,
a difference in utility between two variants must be fully explained by the
terms involving the observable characteristics. Letting either the taste shock
or the unobserved product characteristic vary across variants of a product
is therefore not justified. The model in this paper holds both unobserved
characteristics and taste shocks fixed across variants.
While my demand model is different, I maintain the substantive assumptions
of the recent automobile demand literature5: there are unobserved differences
and idiosyncratic tastes for models. The difference is in how I deal with the
additional information in my data (engine variants).6 As in many markets, it
is plausible that consumers have real idiosyncratic tastes for models. When
this is the case, removing the iid shock altogether, as in Bajari and Benkard
(2005) and Berry and Pakes (2007), would underestimate product differen-
5BLP, Petrin (2002), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004).
6Of course the literature abstracts away from the variant issue: each consumer chooses a
car model whose price and engine characteristics are chosen by the researcher from among
the model’s range of engine variants. Since the demand models depend on correctly
estimating the coefficients on price and engine characteristics in utility, this may be a
problematic simplification.
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tiation. On the other hand, Petrin (2002) points out the idiosyncratic term
introduces a new product characteristic for each new product. This may
overestimate the benefits of increasing product variety. But in this paper
shocks enter only at the model level. Therefore, when I compare equilibria
with one and many variants per model, the number of product characteristics
does not change.
A final point about the demand model is that it permits identification with
weaker assumptions than in the literature because of the richer data. Gold-
berg (1995) restricts the unobserved product characteristic to be the same
across car models of a given brand. Brand-level fixed effects control for un-
observable characteristics. BLP relax this assumption by including model-
specific dummies to control for unobservables at the model level. But these
dummies capture the mean effect of observed characteristics as well as un-
observed characteristics. To separate the two effects, BLP need to assume
orthogonality between unobserved and observed characteristics. Any model
that allows for alternative-specific unobservables needs this orthogonality as-
sumption.7 However, the assumption is problematic because both types of
product characteristics are choice variables of manufacturers.8 I relax both
the orthogonality assumption of BLP and Goldberg’s restriction that unob-
servables are fixed across models of a brand. Since unobservables do not vary
across variants, I can control for unobservables with model-level fixed effects.
Price and product characteristics vary within models, so that their effects
are separately identified.
In the empirical literature on price discrimination, McManus (2007) and Co-
hen (2008) are similar to this paper, in that they estimate structural demand
models to decompose costs and markups, and thereby draw conclusions about
second-degree price discrimination (in quantities of specialty coffee and paper
7BLP micro (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 2004) in principle need it too, but instead
use calibration to find the unidentified parameters.
8E.g. Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007) p. 4197 say: “There are plausi-
ble reasons to believe that product characteristics themselves are correlated with ξ [the
unobservable]”.
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towels, respectively). Both studies use random-coefficients logit models with
idiosyncratic taste shocks for each alternative, which is serving size/package
size. This introduces an element of horizontal differentiation between quan-
tity variants that is unrelated to quantity itself.9 This assumption will in-
fluence the estimated markups and substitution patterns, and thereby the
conclusions about price discrimination. In contrast, my model follows the
theory literature on price discrimination in assuming that quality variants
differ only in observed quality.
Verboven (1999) and Verboven (2002) look at price discrimination over au-
tomobile engine sizes and fuel types, respectively. Both papers find that
there is discrimination across variants, as is confirmed in this paper. These
studies differ from my paper in that they do not use fully structural mod-
els of demand for variants.10 Like Ellison (2005) and Ellison and Ellison
(2009), Verboven (1999) emphasises the role of imperfect information about
the prices of premium variants in explaining the presence of discrimination.
In this respect, my results show that there may be price discrimination also
when consumers are perfectly informed about prices.
The next section describes the utility model and derives the choice prob-
abilities. Section 3 explains the identification strategy and compares it to
the literature. Section 4 describes the data, and attempts to show that the
assumptions of the model are satisfied by the data. Section 5 describes the
estimator, section 6 the results. Section 7 looks at price discrimination across
engine sizes.
9The distribution of the taste shocks is not estimated. Therefore the models cannot let
the data determine the extent of horizontal differentiation between quantity variants.
10One paper uses a reduced-form specification, and the other conditions on the choice
of model, and only models the choice of variant.
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2 Model
2.1 Utility
I estimate the parameters of the conditional (on product choice) indirect
utility functions of potential car buyers. Products are grouped into mod-
els. Products within a model, called variants, differ only with respect to
observable characteristics. Products in different models differ with respect
to characteristics that are not observable to the researcher, but known by
market agents. Let J = {0, . . . , J} be the choice set, where j = 0 is the
outside good.11 Each product is described by a double (xj , m(j)) - a vector
of observable product characteristics and an index for the model to which
the product belongs. Let the vector x0j be the subvector of xj consisting of
the variant characteristics (all characteristics that vary across variants of a
model) and let x1m(j) be the remaining characteristics (model characteristics),
so xj = (x
0
j , x
1
m(j)). Let pj be price, yi income, and zi a vector of observable
consumer characteristics. Conditional on choosing product j consumer i has
indirect utility:
uij = −(α¯ + α˜i)pj + x
0
j (β¯
0 + β˜0i ) + x
1
m(j)β˜
1
i + δm(j) + ǫim(j) (1)
ui0 = ξ0 + ǫi0 (2)
α˜i = α˜(zi, yi) (3)
β˜ri = β˜
r(zi, νi), r = 0, 1 (4)
ǫim(j) ∼ iid extreme value, (5)
where α˜ and β˜ are functions of consumer characteristics whose realisations
(zi) or distributions (yi, νi) are known.
The model mean effects, δ, can in theory be decomposed into the mean effect
of model characteristics and unobservable characteristics: δm = x
1
m(j)β¯
1 +
11Individuals or products are not followed across time. I.e. they have different subscripts
for different years of data.
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ξm. For most applications, the decomposition of δ is not required, nor is it
identified with the assumptions used in this paper. Unlike in the literature,
δ does not contain the mean effects of price and variant characteristics.
ξm+ ǫim captures the common and consumer-specific valuation of any aspect
of modelm that is not controlled for by the observable characteristics x. Since
variants of a model differ only with respect to observable characteristics x0
these terms have m-subscripts.
ǫ captures effects of unobservable characteristics which do not provide any
information about the unobservable effect of another product on the same
consumer, nor on the effect on a different consumer. An example is consumer
A who likes the look of VW Golf, but dislikes the Ford Focus; consumer B
who thinks the Golf is boring, and the Focus elegant; consumer C who likes
the look of the Golf, and loves the Focus.
2.2 Choice probabilities
Denote the ‘observable’ part of utility u− (δ + ǫ),
Vij = −(α¯ + α˜i)pj + x
0
j (β¯
0 + β˜0i ) + x
1
m(j)β˜
1
i .
Conditional on the realisations of the random variables (y, ν) the probability
that consumer i chooses model m is
Pr(m|i, y, ν) = Pr(max
j∈Jm
{Vij}+ δm + ǫim (6)
> max
j′∈Jm
′
{Vij′}+ δm′ + ǫim′ , m
′ 6= m|i, y, ν)
=
exp(maxj∈Jm{Vij}+ δm)
1 +
∑
m′∈M exp(maxj′∈Jm′{Vij′}+ δm′t)
, (7)
where Jm is the set of variants of model m, andM is the set of models in the
market. Conditional on (y, ν), the max{V }-terms are not random variables.
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The second equality therefore follows in a standard way by integrating over
the distribution of the ǫ-term to obtain a logit choice probability.
Still conditional on (y, ν), consumer i’s probability of choosing j is equal to
Pr(m|i, y, ν) if j maximises {Vij} over J
m, and zero otherwise. Letting the
indicator function 1[j|m, i, y, ν] be one in the first case and zero in the second
case, we can write the choice probability of product j
Pr(j|i, y, ν) = 1[j|m, i, y, ν]
exp(maxj∈Jm{Vij}+ δm)
1 +
∑
m′∈M exp(maxj′∈Jm{Vij′}+ δm′)
. (8)
Integrating over the distributions of y and ν, we now get consumer i’s un-
conditional choice probability for product j
Pr(j|i) =
∫ ∫
Pr(j|i, y, ν)f(y|i)f(ν)dydν, (9)
where f(ν) is the joint density of ν, and f(y|i) is the density of the em-
pirical income distribution in the population for consumers with observed
characteristics zi in the time period t(i) in which i enters the data.
3 Identification
The model is estimated by assuming orthogonality between the individual-
level prediction error (difference between observed choices and choice prob-
abilities) and explanatory variables. This error term is distinct from the
literature’s unobserved product characteristic. I control for unobserved prod-
uct characteristics using fixed effects for car models in the utility function.
Unobserved product characteristics therefore do not enter the error term.
The error term is pure sampling error. Price and product characteristics are
therefore exogenous. I do not need orthogonality between unobserved and
observed product characteristics to identify the price parameter, since it is
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identified by within-model variation separately from model fixed effects.
3.1 Unobserved product characteristics and identifying assumptions
In discrete-choice demand models consumers choose among alternatives by
maximising a utility function that depends on observed product character-
istics. But typically consumers also care about product characteristics that
are not observed by the researcher. Berry (1994) and BLP solve this problem
by introducing product-specific constants in utility.
The product-specific constants ensure that utility includes the effect of unob-
servables. But the product-specific constants also capture the mean (across
consumers) effect of price and observed characteristics. In order to separate
the two effects, the literature assumes that unobserved and observed prod-
uct characteristics are orthogonal.12 That is, the observed characteristics of
a product provides no information that affects the expected value of the un-
observed characteristic of that product. Since both unobserved and observed
characteristics are choice variables of firms, this assumption is problematic.13
12When observations are at the level of products, like in BLP, the orthogonality assump-
tion is in fact crucial to identify any parameters at all. Since the product-level constants
are observation specific, they explain all the variation in the data. Berry (1994) shows
that regardless of the values of the other parameters, we can find product-level constants
that exactly matches the model’s predicted market shares to the observed counterparts.
Individual-level studies can in fact avoid the orthogonality assumption by letting the co-
efficients on prices and product characteristics be of the form β¯ + β˜i with β¯ = 0, where
β˜i is an interaction with demographic variables, income or another random variable. This
is, however, a dubious identification of the “marginal effects” of x, since marginal utilities
are not identified if β˜i = 0, β¯ 6= 0 instead.
13Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007) p. 4197 say: ”There are plausible reasons
to believe that product characteristics themselves are correlated with ξ [the unobservable].
After all the product design team has at leas some control over the level of ξ, and the
costs and benefits of producing different levels of the unobservable characteristic might well
vary with the observed characteristics of the product.” Ackerberg and Crawford (2006)
say: ”Just like price, product characteristics are typically choice variables of firms, and as
such one might worry that they are actually correlated with unobserved components of
demand.”
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An alternative identification strategy, which does not require orthogonality
between unobserved and observed characteristics, is to use variation across
products for which the unobserved characteristic can be assumed fixed. In
this way Goldberg (1995) uses fixed effects for automobile brands to control
for unobservable product characteristics.
My identification strategy uses the same principle. I restrict unobservable
characteristics to be the same across engine variants of each car model. Since
I observe products at the variant level, I can control for unobservables at the
model-market level (rather than brand) with fixed effects. I therefore do not
need either Goldberg’s restriction that unobservables are the same within a
brand, or BLP’s orthogonality assumption.
3.2 The error term
The model is estimated by assuming orthogonality between the individual-
level prediction error (difference between choice probabilities and the indi-
cator function for observed choices) and the explanatory variables (product
and consumer characteristics).
When observed market shares are generated by a large number of consumers,
sampling error (the difference between a market share generated by a small
number of consumers and the choice probability of the true model) should
go to zero, i.e. choice probabilities should exactly equal observed market
shares. This paper uses individual-level data, but I observe only the sex and
age of the buyer, so that the data can be regarded as market-share data
for submarkets defined by the age and sex of the buyers. In each market
there is only about 500 individuals distributing between approximately 300
(inside) alternatives. On average, therefore, each observation (group market
share) is generated by less than two individuals. Since the true model’s choice
probabilities for each submarket will not be attained with such a low number
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of draws, there will be a discrepancy between observed and predicted shares.
The prediction error is therefore explained by sampling error.
The literature emphasises that price is endogenous because the error term
is the unobserved product characteristic. In this paper, the error term is
not the unobserved characteristic, but rather the individual-level prediction
error. Unobserved product characteristics are controlled for by the model
fixed effects. Therefore they do not enter the error term. I assume individual-
level sampling error does not enter the structural pricing (supply) equation.
Price is therefore exogenous.
4 Data
The first subsection describes the data. The assumption that there are no
unobservable differences between variants is central to the paper’s identifi-
cation strategy. In subsection 4.2 results from a hedonic regression indicate
that the assumption holds. Subsection 4.3 discusses how care has been taken
to ensure that trim levels do not cause unobservable differences between en-
gine variants. Subsection 4.4 discusses further issues concerning trim levels.
The reader who does not care about this issue may skip subsections 4.3 and
4.4.
4.1 Data
The data set is constructed by combining two data sources: new vehicle regis-
trations and price lists from Norway 2000-2007.14 The registration data give
the number of units sold by the sex and age of the buyer.15 I define models
14Both were provided by Opplysningsr˚adet for Vegtrafikken AS (the information council
for road traffic).
15In the sales data, products are defined by the following characteristics: brand, model
(nameplate), body type, cylinder volume, horsepower, fuel type, number of seats and drive-
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as products of the same brand (e.g. Toyota) and of the same nameplate (e.g.
Corolla). Variants are defined by the engine, as specified by horsepower and
whether it is diesel or not. The sales of a variant is the sum of sales over
all products of a model which are the same in terms of horsepower and fuel
type. (In the literature, for instance in BLP, sales are the sums over products
with the same nameplate.)
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Means by sex and age
Men Women
year variable meana s.d. 18-35 36-51 52- 18-35 36-51 52-
2000 variants 241
models 82
priceb 327 157 292 306 276 242 243 225
tax 97 60 88 91 79 68 67 61
unit sales 56300 7961 15433 15483 4156 8008 5259
2007 variants 375
models 94
price 351 194 318 335 310 273 279 245
tax 154 127 123 133 119 100 103 86
unit sales 78139 10907 21499 23064 4444 10245 7980
aNot sales-weighted
bPrice and tax in 1000s of 2004 kroner, adjusted by CPI.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the first and last of the eight years in the
data. The data have the sales of 491,853 units, spread over 2397 products,
661 models (giving an average of 3.6 variants per model), 48 age groups and
two sex groups. There is considerable variation along dimensions useful for
identifying the parameters: the number of products across years, average car
tax in different years, and in the purchases of different consumer groups.16
wheels (two-wheel drive vs. four-wheel drive). Price lists include the further product
characteristics length, weight, fuel consumption at mixed driving, airconditioning, number
of collision bags, number of gears, automatic vs. manual gears, whether frontwheel or rear-
wheel drive if 2WD, number of doors, and styling package: a set of features (predominantly
aesthetic) summed up by a tag, like ‘sportline’ or ‘comfort’.
16Differences in average characteristics purchased between groups for a given choice set
reveal the role of demographic variables. Correlations in sales across time within groups
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To allow consumers the choice of not purchasing a new car I need an estimate
of the total market size. Since my data are by individual rather than by
household, I could use the total population in each demographic (sex-age)
group to estimate market size. However, on average 98.5% of people do not
buy a new car in a given period. Since the goal is to analyse substitution
patterns for cars, it seems reasonable to focus on the preferences of a more
closely defined group.17 I let the market size of a consumer group be twice
the maximum (across periods in the data) number of people in that group
who bought a new car.
The income distributions conditional on demographic group are from the
population as a whole, not from the potential car buyers as I have defined
them, but this is the best approximation available. I use data from Statistics
Norway on the number of people in twelve sex-age groups belonging to each
of nine income brackets to estimate a kernel-smoothed income probability
density function for each population group.
4.2 A hedonic regression
The assumption that there are no unobservable differences between models
is central to the identification strategy of this paper. Results from a hedonic
regression indicate that the assumption holds. Since any unobservable dif-
ference that affects the average consumer’s valuation of a good should show
up in price, I look at how much of price variation can be explained by ob-
served characteristics and model effects. Regressing prices (for all products)
when the choice set changes (number of products, price, characteristics) reveal the effect
of unobserved heterogeneity. Differences in (groupwise) sales within a model reveal the
mean effects of price and engine characteristics.
17Also, for a given number of simulation draws, the larger the share of the outside good,
the fewer simulation draws will result in a choice of one of the inside alternatives, making
the simulation of the inside market shares less accurate. The problem could be reduced
by oversampling draws that land on inside goods, like BLP do, but it requires an initial
estimation with standard simulation techniques, which is difficult to do with any accuracy
given the large computational burden of the model.
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on model(-year) dummies (2397 products, 660 dummies), horsepower, fuel
cost and diesel, cylinder volume and squares of horsepower, fuel cost and
cylinder volume, and a constant gives an R-squared of 0.9913, leaving little
scope for variant-specific unobservables to explain price variation.18 Results
are given in table 2.
Table 2: Regression of price on engine characteristics and model dummies. Unit of
observation is variants. 2397 observations. Coefficients on the 660 model dummies not
shown.
R-squared 0.9913
explanatory variable estimate p-value
horsepower -0.005 0.547
fuel cost 0.099 0.000
diesel 0.035 0.000
cylinder volume 0.023 0.002
horsepower squared 0.085 0.000
fuel cost squared -0.026 0.031
cyl. vol. squared 0.009 0.000
constant 0.066 0.000
4.3 Trim level: characteristics that vary within product units
In general, tractability concerns dictate that not all product characteristics
can be included in the econometric model. Typically, for a given product unit
as defined in the econometric model (e.g. nameplate/engine) the consumer
faces a choice of other characteristics (e.g. transmission, leather interior),
which affect the price of the product.
Denote the bundle of characteristics not included the ‘trim level’.19 To assign
one price to each variant it is necessary to choose a trim level for each product.
18Including further engine-related characteristics (weight, co2 emissions), interactions
and third- and fourth-order terms increases R-squared to as much as 0.9972, but this is
open to charges of overfitting.
19Depending on specific modelling assumptions, my definition of the expression ‘trim’
may be wider than common usage.
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Denote this the ‘baseline’ trim level. A central identifying assumption in this
paper is that there are no unobserved differences between variants. In the
following I discuss trim levels in some detail in order to show that this issue
does not cause any violation of the restriction on unobservables.
Trim levels do not cause any unobserved difference between variants as long
as three conditions are satisfied: the same set of trim upgrades over the
baseline is available for all variants of a model; the price of upgrades is the
same for all variants; and variants within a model are assigned the same
baseline trim level.20 Together with additively separable utility, this ensures
that consumers choose trim upgrade independently of variant.21 The next
three paragraphs look at how each condition is satisfied.
In some cases not all variant/trim-combinations show up in the price lists.
But examination of car brands’ national web pages show that every engine
variant is available with the full choice of trim levels in almost all cases. The
few exceptions are mostly variants with engine sizes that are outliers relative
to the model range, whose market shares are extremely small, which are not
offered with the cheapest trim levels.
The price lists show that a given trim upgrade almost always costs the same
regardless of engine size. That is, if you have to pay $321 to upgrade from
“basic” to “super” in the 2.0litre variant, you also pay $321 for the same
upgrade with the 2.4litre variant. I use this regularity to infer prices for
variant/trim-combinations that are missing in the data. For the variants
20In fact a weaker condition on availability is sufficient: let Jm
i
⊂ Jm be the subset
of variants in model m such that consumer i prefers any variant in Jm
i
to any variant
in Jm − Jm
i
regardless of trim level (even if the variants in the first set have the worst
possible trim and those in the second the best possible). Then it is sufficient that the trim
level that i prefers is available for all variants in Jm
i
, since the availability of trim will not
change the choice of variant. It follows that for instance unavailability of low-end trim
with top-end engine variants is unlikely to contaminate the estimated tastes for engine
size.
21Because of heterogeneity in price sensitivity, this framework is consistent with more
expensive variants being sold with more expensive trim: people who do not mind paying
extra for more horsepower may not mind paying extra for leather seats.
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that still do not have a price at the baseline trim after imputing prices in
this way, I reassign sales to nearest neighbour (according to horsepower, and
if tied, fuel type).
The final condition, that all variants of a model are assigned the same baseline
trim is up to the researcher as long as the corresponding prices are available.
Since I do not have prices for every variant-trim combination, I chose as
baseline the package for which I have prices for the variants corresponding
to the highest sales (if tied, the cheapest package).22
This discussion shows that the issue of baseline trim does not cause any un-
observed differences between variants. Still the choice of baseline may be
of some consequence. But as I discuss in the next subsection, these conse-
quences are likely to be negligible - especially by comparison to the literature,
where baseline trim also includes engine characteristics.
4.4 Trim level here and in the literature
A consumer’s valuation of the baseline trim level will enter the unobserved
characteristic. Choosing “super” instead of “basic” as baseline for model
m will increase the prices of all variants in m by an equal amount. To
ensure that m keeps its market share δm will adjust upwards. For any given
consumer the effect is exactly the same on all variants, and therefore does not
create unobserved differences between variants. But the choice of baseline
may still have an effect: consumers with a low price sensitivity will substitute
into model m (which has become more attractive since they exchange money
22The raw data have total sales of 523,702 over eight years. For 499,167 of these matches
are found between price lists and sales data. Failures may be due to privately imported
obsolete products. Observations that cannot be matched are discarded. The number of
sales for which there is a match between the two data sources, and for which I can find a
price (at a baseline trim level) is is 440,821. Remaining sales are reattributed to nearest
neighbours. Finally I discard models with sales in a given year of less than 100 units. This
reduces the number of products from 3,588 to 2,397 and total sales to 491,853.
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against δ at a higher rate than the average consumer; and an equal amount
with high price sensitivity will substitute out of the model). This may in
principle affect the estimated distribution of price sensitivity. But the effect
of these trim differences is likely to be negligible compared to the effects of
engine characteristics, and model characteristics such as segment and size.
The choice of baseline is of less consequence in this paper than in the model-
level literature. There are three reasons for this: first, in model-level studies,
trim includes engine upgrades over the baseline engine. Since this makes trim
account for a larger share of utility, the magnitude of the problem is greater.
Secondly, I do not estimate tastes for components of trim, while model-level
studies do, since engine characteristics are in trim. Increasing baseline engine
size therefore changes components of x. This makes consumers with low
tastes for engine size substitute out of the model, which may affect estimates
further. Thirdly, engine upgrades may be correlated (in the population of car
models) with baseline engine sizes (in ways that may depend on the choice of
baseline). Since the engine upgrades enter the unobserved characteristic, ξ,
they may be an additional source of dependence between ξ and x, violating
the orthogonality assumption used in the literature.
5 Estimation
5.1 The objective function
Parameters are estimated by GMM, with moments
gij(θ) = Zij[dij − Pr(j|i, θ, δ(θ))], (10)
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where Z is a vector of functions of the explanatory variables.23 dij is one if
consumer i chooses alternative j, zero otherwise. Pr(j|i, θ, δ(θ)) is consumer
i’s choice probability for product j as defined in the model section (equations
(7-9). The model-market fixed effects, δ, are a function of the parameters,
found by setting the aggregate (across consumers) model choice probabilities
equal to model market shares: sm = P (m|θ, δ).
The objective function is
[ n∑
i=1
∑
j∈J t(i)
gij(θ)
]′
W
[ n∑
i=1
∑
j∈J t(i)
gij(θ)
]
, where (11)
W =
[
(n)−1
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈J t(i)
Z ′ijZij
]−1
,
where J t(i) is the choice set of consumer i, depending on the time period
where i is observed, and n is the number of individuals observed (sum of
market sizes over groups and years). Efficiency could be improved by ap-
proximating the ideal instruments using initial estimates. But because of
the large computational burden, and because the size of the data set makes
efficiency relatively less of a worry I choose to use estimates from (11) as
final.
The vector δ that sets predicted and observed model market shares equal is
found by the BLP contraction mapping.24 Conditional on the parameters,
the model choice probabilities are an average over logit choice probabilities,
like in BLP.
2320 parameters to estimate, 22 instruments: price, price2, kw, kw2, kw ·
age, kw · age2, kw · wom, fuelcost, fuelcost2, fuelcost · age, fuelcost ·
age2, fuelcost · wom, diesel, diesel · age, diesel · age2, diesel ·
wom, length, length2, age, age2, wom, constant.
24δt+1m = δ
t
m + log sm − logP (m|θ, δ
t)
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5.2 Simulation and asymptotic properties
The integral with respect to the density of ν and y in the choice probabilities
is computed by a frequency simulator.25 The simulator is not smooth in
the parameters. I analytically integrate over the distribution of the logit
term, but the choice probabilities still contain discontinuous functions of
the parameters: the indicator function 1[j|m], and a max function for every
model.26 Indicator functions or max functions may change in jumps or not
at all for a given change in their argument, making the same true for the
objective function that depends on them. McFadden (1989) (Theorem 1, p.
1014) shows consistency and asymptotic normality for an estimator like (11)
where g is simulated by a function allowed to have jumps.27 A consistent
estimator for the asymptotic covariance matrix is
ˆAvar(θˆ) = (Gˆ′WGˆ)−1Gˆ′W ΛˆWGˆ(Gˆ′WGˆ)−1/n where (12)
Gˆ = n−1
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈J t(i)
∇θgij(θˆ) (13)
Λˆ = n−1
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈J t(i)
∑
j′≥j
gij(θˆ)gij′(θˆ)
′. (14)
25Using 30 quasi-random draws (scrambled Halton, generated by Matlab’s haltonset) for
each of the 96 consumer groups in each of the 8 years. See Train (2003) for a discussion
of Halton draws.
26I did not want to use a smoothed simulator (such as a logit-smoothed accept-reject)
as discussed in McFadden (1989), because it would effectively remove the feature of my
model that variants differ only with respect to observed characteristics. In principle one
could create a smooth simulator by decomposing the unconditional probability into a sum
of probabilities conditional on which variant is chosen in each model, times the probability
of the conditioned-on event. If there are M models and each model has V variants, the
sum will have MV terms, i.e. approximately 6613.6 = 1.4E+10 in this paper. The com-
putational burden is roughly proportional to the number of separate choice probabilities
which need to be computed, which is proportional to the number of draws and to the
number of terms in the sum above. Therefore the computational burden goes down with
the smooth simulator relative to the one I use only if we can reduce the number of draws
by a factor of MV to obtain an equally good simulator. A second alternative would be to
use a
27See his assumption A12 p. 1018 for a regularity condition on the behaviour of the
simulator.
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Berry, Linton, and Pakes (2004) show that under assumptions typical in the
IO demand literature, consistency requires that the number of simulation
draws must grow as the square of the number of products. There are two
reasons that the result does not apply to the model in this paper (so that I
can rely on the results of McFadden (1989)). First, they analyse a situation of
dependence between observations in market-level data, because one market
share depends on the shares of other products. In this paper observations
are individual purchases which do not depend on each other. Secondly, they
look at a model where the error term (the unobservable characteristic) is a
nonlinear transformation of the predicted market shares, so that simulation
errors in the choice probabilities will cause a bias. In this paper the error
term is a linear function of the choice probabilities, so that simulation error
cancels across observations and disappears as the number of observations
goes to infinity with the number of simulation draws held fixed.
Because of the irregularity of the objective function I need an optimisation
algorithm that does not require continuity and is robust to local optima. I
use the differential evolution genetic algorithm.28
6 Results
6.1 Parameter estimates
Table 3 shows the estimates from the full model, and table 4 gives variable
definitions and units. The mean taste coefficients, obtained by interacting
with the mean values of the demographic variables, are: horsepower -7.7, fuel
cost 18.7, diesel 0.6, and price -16.6. (For length and the constant for the
outside good the means are contained in δ and therefore unknown.)
28Developed by Kenneth Price and Rainer Storn, implemented for Matlab in the devec3
code. The code can be found on www.icsi.berkeley.edu/∼storn/code.html.
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Table 3: Parameter estimates from the full model. 491,853 observations.
product interacted est. s.e.
characteristic with
horsepower 4.767 0.007
fuel cost (kroner/km) 4.932 0.007
diesel -0.011 0.001
horsepower age -12.303 0.024
age sq. -24.685 0.033
woman 1.425 0.010
fuel cost (kroner/km) age 12.172 0.021
age sq. 30.062 0.042
woman -1.604 0.013
diesel age 0.044 0.003
age sq. 2.158 0.004
woman 0.117 0.008
horsepower std.norm. 0.435 0.005
fuel cost (kroner/km) std.norm. -0.167 0.004
diesel std.norm. 1.229 0.015
length std.norm. -0.102 0.007
inside good (const.) std.norm. 7.719 0.010
pricea α1 2.935 0.014
α2 47.082 0.074
α3 3.614 0.007
aThe price coefficient is −[α1 + α2 exp(−α3 · incomei)].
Table 4: Variables and units
Variable Unit mean st.dev. min max
pricea kroner*1E-6 0.34 0.18 0.12 1.87
horsepower kW*1E-2 0.98 0.39 0.37 3.75
fuel cost (kr/litre)*(litres/km) 0.77 0.19 0.38 1.86
diesel 1 if diesel, 0 if petrol 0.34 0.47 0 1
length metres 4.40 0.32 3.41 5.08
ageb age*1E-2 0.50 0.23 0.70
age sq. age squared *1E-4 0.27 0.05 0.49
woman 1 if woman, 0 if man 0.29 0 1
income kroner*1E-6 0.34 1E-3 3.28
aprice, fuel cost and income in 2004 kroner, adjusted by CPI. 100
kroner, abbr. ‘kr’, is about 12 euros or 17 US dollars.
bPersons of age<23 are assigned age 23 and with age>70 assigned
age 70.
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The first two do not have the expected signs. Clearly the analysis does not
succeed in disentangling these highly correlated effects. However, since the
variables represent aspects of the same underlying feature, engine size, this
does not necessarily compromise the model’s ability to predict substitution
patterns. A consumer usually cannot change one of these characteristics
without changing the other, and so the effect of having a different engine in
practice works through both characteristics. Gramlich (2009) discusses this
technological frontier in detail.
I regress horsepower on fuel cost over all products to obtain a rough measure
of the technological connection between the two. The slope coefficient is
1.45. So if, starting from the average car, we move to a car with fuel cost
0.1 (kr/km) higher this car would typically have horsepower 0.145 (14.5 kW)
higher. The average consumer would be willing to pay (−7.7 · 0.145 + 18.7 ·
0.1)/16.6 = 0.0454, i.e. 45,540 kroner for this change. To see that this is
roughly in line with market conditions, a regression of price on horsepower
and fuel cost yields coefficients 0.43 and -0.13, respectively. Plugging in the
changes in the two variables, we can expect price to go up by 0.43 · 0.145−
0.13 · 0.1 = 0.0493, i.e. 49,300 kroner.29
6.2 Price elasticities
I compute price elasticities for models by taking derivatives with respect
to a change in the prices of all variants in a model as a percentage of the
sales-weighted mean price. Own-price elasticities range from -3 to -7, and
absolute value tends to increase with price. For semi-elasticities this pattern
29Slope is 1.69 if I include length and diesel in the horsepower regression. Any charac-
teristic in the regression is conditioned on, so in this case the slope is the technological
trade-off between fuel cost and horsepower keeping length and fuel type constant. Will-
ingness to pay is 34,300 if length and fuel type are kept constant. Including length and
diesel in the price regression gives coefficients of 0.35 and 0.19, resulting in an expected
price change of 0.35 · .169 + 0.19 · 0.1 = 0.0781, 78,100 kroner. All regression coefficients
are significant to 95% except that (-0.13) on fuel cost in the first price regression.
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is reversed.
Table 5 shows own- and cross-price elasticities (multiplied by 100 for read-
ability) for a sample of models in the 2007 market (found by ordering models
by price and picking every fifth product). Products are ordered by price with
highest price top right. As usual the table shows the elasticity of demand of
the row entry with respect to the price of the column entry. There is a clear
pattern of higher cross-elasticities close to the diagonal (from top-right to
bottom-left), and lower as we move away from the diagonal: cross-elasticities
are higher among products in the same price category.
Variant own-price elasticities are larger in magnitude than those for models,
since they include substitution within the model. Unlike model elasticities,
variant-own price elasticities (and semi-elasticities) decrease in absolute value
with price, presumably because intra-model substitution is larger in cheaper
models.
Table 6 shows variant elasticities for several variants of the same models with
the purpose of highlighting intra-model substitution patterns. The products
were picked by taking a few arbitrary blocks of products adjacent in the
data. Elasticities between variants of the same model can be high, but not
all are, and some are zero. Restricting the idiosyncratic shock to be the same
for all variants of a model permits, but does not impose, high intra-model
elasticities. Substitution is spread less evenly across all products compared
to demand models with idiosyncratic tastes for all products.
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Table 5: Model elasticities (x100) - w.r.t. price change for all variants of a model
Model
Mercedes-Benz E -452 1.4 18.3 0.9 0.6 0.5 2.5 5.3 3.3 0.4 9.5 0.4 3.2 0.9 2.2 0.2
Saab 9-5 3.5 -510 20.3 1.0 0.7 0.5 3.1 6.5 4.0 0.6 12.3 0.6 4.6 1.3 3.4 0.4
Toyota RAV4 3.1 1.3 -455 1.2 0.9 0.6 3.9 8.3 5.0 0.7 16.3 0.8 6.6 1.9 5.2 0.6
Jeep PATRIOT 3.0 1.3 24.1 -481 0.9 0.6 4.0 8.5 5.1 0.8 16.7 0.8 6.8 2.0 5.4 0.6
Hyundai TUCSON 2.9 1.3 24.4 1.2 -487 0.7 4.3 9.0 5.4 0.8 18.1 0.9 7.6 2.2 6.1 0.7
Kia SPORTAGE 2.5 1.1 19.8 1.0 0.8 -490 5.0 8.5 5.9 1.0 19.5 1.0 9.2 2.6 6.8 1.0
Mazda 6 2.0 1.0 18.3 0.9 0.7 0.7 -483 9.2 6.7 1.2 23.4 1.2 12.1 3.4 9.2 1.4
VW TOURAN 2.3 1.1 21.0 1.1 0.8 0.7 5.0 -479 6.2 1.0 22.3 1.1 10.3 3.1 8.9 1.1
Volvo V50 2.1 1.0 18.6 0.9 0.7 0.7 5.3 9.1 -488 1.1 22.8 1.2 11.4 3.3 9.2 1.4
Dodge CALIBER 1.7 0.9 18.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 6.0 9.6 7.1 -474 25.3 1.3 13.5 3.9 10.6 1.6
VW GOLF’ 1.8 0.9 18.4 0.9 0.7 0.7 5.7 10.0 7.0 1.2 -453 1.3 13.2 4.0 11.4 1.6
Hyundai I30 1.6 0.9 18.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 5.9 10.0 7.2 1.2 26.7 -452 13.9 4.2 11.9 1.8
Toyota COROLLA 1.4 0.8 16.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 6.5 10.2 7.7 1.4 29.3 1.5 -441 4.8 13.7 2.1
Kia CEE”D 1.3 0.7 16.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 6.3 10.5 7.7 1.4 30.0 1.6 16.4 -432 14.5 2.2
Toyota YARIS 1.2 0.7 16.6 0.9 0.7 0.7 6.3 11.2 7.9 1.4 32.1 1.7 17.4 5.4 -407 2.4
Honda JAZZ 0.9 0.6 13.0 0.7 0.6 0.7 6.8 9.7 8.2 1.5 32.6 1.7 19.2 5.8 17.0 -406
Mazda 2 0.8 0.5 12.1 0.6 0.5 0.6 6.9 9.8 8.3 1.6 34.5 1.8 20.6 6.4 18.9 3.5
Kia PICANTO 0.8 0.6 15.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 6.3 14.0 8.2 1.4 39.5 2.0 21.8 7.1 24.4 3.1
25
Table 6: Intra- and inter-model price elasticities (x100)
Variant
Citr. C4 1.4 l 87 hp P -6669 501 5720 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 17.1 0.0 0.0 14.5
Citr. C4 1.6 l 88 hp D 203.6 -3680 220 2698 99.5 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Citr. C4 1.6 l 107 hp P 1004 75.2 -1704 65.7 98.6 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 5.5
Citr. C4 1.6 l 107 hp D 0.0 5890 311 -9381 3243 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 4.2 0.0 0.0
Citr. C4 2 l 134 hp D 0.0 90.0 152 734 -1637 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.8 2.7 0.0 0.0
Citr. C5 1.6 l 107 hp D 0.1 2.4 0.2 0.8 1.7 -627 164 0.0 0.2 1.4 2.1 0.0 0.1
Citr. C5 1.7 l 121 hp P 0.7 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.2 142 -626 0.0 0.0 10.6 0.0 0.0 6.2
Toy. COROLLA 1.4 l 95 hp P 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 -11176 0.0 4236 0.0 0.0 42.4
Toy. COROLLA 2 l 114 hp D 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 -52847 303 25431 0.0 0.0
Toy. COROLLA 1.6 l 122 hp P 1.2 0.1 4.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 1.5 14.0 10.4 -681 69.1 9.3 10.8
Toy. COROLLA 2 l 125 hp D 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.2 3.4 1.2 0.0 0.0 816 416 -2914 0.0 0.0
Toy. COROLLA 1.8 l 127 hp P 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 3121 0.0 -3680 0.2
Toy. YARIS 1.3 l 86 hp P 1.7 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.1 0.0 19.3 0.0 0.0 -651
Toy. YARIS 1.4 l 88 hp D 0.2 3.4 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 3.0 1.3 0.0 219
VW GOLF 1.4 l 79 hp P 2.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 21.5 0.0 0.0 15.8
VW GOLF 1.9 l 88 hp D 0.3 4.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.9 0.4 0.0 0.0
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7 Second-degree price discrimination with engine vari-
ants
This section establishes that there is price discrimination across engine vari-
ants, in the sense that markups increase with engine size within models.
However, a counterfactual shows that average markups would be higher if
firms restricted each model to have only one engine variant. The benefits of
price discrimination therefore do not offset the increased competition when
there are many variants of each model.30
7.1 The supply-side model
Since I have no data on transactions between car manufacturers, import
companies and dealerships, I follow the literature and treat the supply side as
consisting of vertically integrated car companies selling directly to consumers.
The sales price can be decomposed as
pj = (markupj +MCj)(1 + vat) + taxj (15)
where MC is marginal cost (the incremental cost of producing one more unit
of product j). I assume constant marginal costs within the relevant output
ranges (no economies of scale). tax is the engine tax (an increasing convex
function of horsepower, weight and co2 emissions; in 2007 the tax on average
accounts for 40% of price, ranging from 20 to 70%). markup +MC is the
amount the car company is left with after paying the engine tax and the
value-added tax, vat, of 25%.
I follow the literature and assume car companies play a Bertrand game in
which there is a unique equilibrium, where each company f chooses prices of
30The analysis in this section uses the demand system estimated on the full data set,
but markups and the counterfactual are computed only for the 2007 market.
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its set Ff of products to maximise profits
Πf =
∑
j∈Ff
[
pj − taxj
1 + vat
−MCj ]Msj(p)− Cf , (16)
where M is the size of the market (summed over all consumer groups). In
equilibrium the first-order conditions for profit maximisation of each product
must hold:
0 =
sj(p)
1 + vat
+
∑
j′∈F (j)
[
pj′ − taxj′
1 + vat
−MCj′]
∂sj′(p)
∂pj
, j = 1, . . . , J (17)
where F (j) denotes the set of products owned by the company which owns
product j. The only unknowns are the marginal costs, which I find by solving
this system of J linear equations in the J unknowns. Once the system of
equations is solved, we know markups and marginal costs.
7.2 Is there price discrimination over engine variants?
It is common to offer several quality variants of what is otherwise the same
product. Some examples are different CPUs and hard-drives for PCs, band-
withs for internet services, business and economy class air travel, and au-
tomobile engine variants. Mussa and Rosen (1978) show how a monopolist
may use qualities (or equivalently quantities) to sort consumers according to
willingness to pay.
In competitive markets second-degree price discrimination over quality may
not be possible. Verboven (1999), Armstrong and Vickers (2001), Rochet and
Stole (2002) find that depending on the intensity of competition, markups
may be fixed across quality variants for each firm. Since the theory results
depend on specific assumptions about differentiation and symmetry, I let the
data determine these specifics. The theory models are special cases of the
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demand model used in this paper.31
Taking the average of the smallest engine variant over all models (with at
least two variants) gives a markup of 52,800 kroner, while the average of
the biggest variant over all models gives a markup of 83,800 kroner. For
comparison, overall sales-weighted mean markup is 57,300 kroner. Average
percentage markups are 18.36 for smallest variants and 19.75 for biggest
variants. Figure 1 plots markups against horsepower for 9 of the 10 models
in 2007 that have seven or more engine variants, with a line fitted by OLS.
Models are arranged in order of increasing mean price, from left to right,
then top to bottom. Markups clearly increase in horsepower for all models,
with overall markups higher for the more expensive products.
To find the average (over models) effect of engine size on markups within a
model, I regress markups (and percentage markups) on horsepower, horse-
power squared and cubed, a constant, and model dummies. The model
dummies isolate the effect of horsepower, so that higher markups for mod-
els with overall higher horsepower does not contaminate the results. Table 7
shows the results. All higher order terms in horsepower are highly significant.
Figure 2 plots the polynomial functions of markups and percentage markups
obtained from the regression. Markups clearly increase in horsepower within
a model, while percentage markups are approximately constant.
The conclusion is clear. Consumers who buy larger engine variants of a
car model pay a higher premium over marginal cost than consumers who
buy smaller engine variants of the same model. In this sense there is second-
degree price discrimination. Percentage markups are approximately constant
across engine variants.
31My model has many products, each firm offers several models with quality variants,
there are several dimensions of taste heterogeneity, and there is an outside good. In the
theory literature there are two firms that each offer one model with quality variants, and
there is one vertical (taste for quality) and one horizontal (taste for models) dimension of
taste heterogeneity. Some theory models do not have an outside good.
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Figure 1: Markups (in 1e-6 kroner, vertical axis) plotted against horsepower (kw*1e-2,
horizontal axis) for models that have seven or more engine variants. Line fitted by OLS.
Models arranged in order of increasing price. For the last two products some large engine
variants do not show.
Table 7: Results from regression of markups and percentage markups (markup/price)
on horsepower, higher order terms of horsepower and model dummies in year 2007. 375
observations, 94 model dummies. Coefficients on model dummies not shown.
Explanatory variables
hp hp2 hp3 constant
Dependent variable
markup -0.029 0.056 -0.007 0.038
(p-value) 0.205 0.001 0.047 0.000
markup/price -0.214 0.129 -0.024 0.295
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure 2: Within-model differences in markups and percentage markups as a function
of engine size. Horsepower in the market ranges from 0.44 to 3.09, sales-weighted mean
0.92kW. 10th to 90th percentile (not sales-weighted) is (0.64,1.65)
Several theory papers find that pricing will be cost-plus-fixed-fee, i.e. no price
discrimination. Since my empirical result is different, it is of interest to see
what assumptions in the theory literature generates the cost-plus-fixed-fee
results. I simulate some simple duopoly models that relax the assumptions
of the models of Verboven (1999) and Ellison (2005) (by including an out-
side good, making qualities and marginal costs asymmetric, and introducing
heterogeneity in one or both the price and quality parameters).32 I find that
constant absolute markups are the exception rather than the rule.33
32I compute two-firm two-quality Nash equilibria in price in models where the taste for
firms is logit; the price coefficient is either 0.5, U(0,1) or N(0.5,0.5); quality coefficient
either 1 or U(0.5,1.5); marginal costs are (3,4) for both firms, or (1,2)/(3,4); qualities are
(7,9) for both, (6,8)/(7,9), or (3,5)/(7,9). If an outside good is included, it has utility -1.5
plus logit term. Equilibria are computed by iterating on the best-response functions. Best
responses are computed using a genetic optimisation algorithm, constraining each firm’s
high quality price to be weakly higher than its low quality price.
33Increasing markups is the most common result, while large asymmetries between firms
may give decreasing absolute markups for one of the firms. For instance, pricing is no
longer cost-plus-fee in Verboven’s model if we include an outside good. Presumably, the
participation constraint puts a downward pressure on prices, and more on the low quality
product which is the closest substitute to the outside option.
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7.3 Does discrimination compensate for increased competition?
The previous subsection establishes that there is price discrimination across
engine variants of car models. But this does not imply that a market with
engine variants is beneficial to firms. Multi-variant models crowd the prod-
uct space and increase competition. Gilbert and Matutes (1993) find that
increased competition from broad quality ranges may outweigh the benefits
of quality-based price discrimination, so that firms would be better off if
they could commit to restrict quality ranges. However, offering a full quality
range is an individual best response regardless of the product line offered
by the other firms. Firms are therefore unable to coordinate on the optimal
outcome, and find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma.
To check whether car companies would prefer a market with single-variant
models, I compare the actual market with equilibrium in a counterfactual
market where each model is offered with only one engine size. I make two
simplifying assumptions: first, that there are no fixed cost investments in-
volved in expanding the range of engine sizes offered within a model (no
economies of scope).34 Secondly, when companies offer only one engine vari-
ant of each model, they choose the one that generates the highest profits in
the current market.35
Table 8 compares outcomes for the counterfactual single-variant equilibrium
with the outcomes in the actual multi-variant equilibrium.36 Profit increases,
34Often a new variant is created by taking the baseline engine of one of the brand’s
higher segment models and putting it in the a lower segment model. Also, developing a
more powerful version is less costly than developing an entirely new engine.
35This is a limitation, and justified only because it simplifies computation. Endogenising
the choice of baseline variant would require the computation of price equilibria for every
possible configuration of engine sizes, which is not feasible. Allowing two choices for each
firm would require the computation of 294 equilibria. Relaxing the assumption of perfect
information about the choices of other firms could simplify the computation of equilibria,
but creating a model of such a game is outside the scope of the paper.
36The numbers for the actual market are based on the model’s predictions of sales. While
these predictions are exactly correct for the sales of each model, and therefore aggregate
sales, the model does not guarantee a perfect fit at the individual and variant level.
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Table 8: Market outcomes with single-variant and multi-variant models
i. single-variant ii. multi-variant change % change
models models
(counterfactual) (actual market)
Profitsa 4356 4460 104 2.4
Tax revenue 8341 9086 744 8.9
from Engine tax 5644 6290 646 5.3
from v.a.t. 2698 2796 98 3.6
Consumer surplus 63820 66597 2777 4.4
Unit sales 75618 77916 2298 3.0
Mean priceb 288.7 296.6 7.9 2.7
Mean markup 57.6 57.3 -0.3 -0.5
Mean horsepower (kW) 87.3 91.6 4.4 5.0
aProfits, tax and consumer surplus in million kroner.
bPrice, markup and horsepower are sales weighted.
but only by a small amount, 2.4 per cent. In fact markups (average profit
per unit) are marginally reduced, and profit goes up only because the in-
creased product variety recruits some (3.0%) new consumers who otherwise
would choose the outside good. It is therefore not price discrimination that
increases profits, but rather increased variety attracting new consumers. Dis-
crimination does not increase profits, which confirms the result of Gilbert and
Matutes (1993).37 Making the characteristics of the remaining engine vari-
ants endogenous may change the results, which should therefore be regarded
with some caution. However, choosing the highest-profit variant of each
model, as I currently do, means that chosen variants tend to be similar for
models in the same segments. Models therefore compete head on in the cur-
rent counterfactual. Allowing firms to choose characteristics would open up
for more specialisation, and thereby increase markups even more, reinforcing
my conclusion.
37This result may depend on the way the engine tax increases the effective marginal cost
of different engine sizes. Since the tax increases convexly in engine size it reduces the scope
for high markups for large engines. The tax succeeds in appropriating a larger amount of
consumer surplus when moving from single-variant to multi-variant models. (Tax revenue
increases by 8.9 per cent, mostly due to the engine tax.) Depending on how much would
be competed away, at least some of this would go to firms if there was no tax.
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Consumers pay more, but are better off, implying that the non-price part
of utility increases more than the disutility of price.38 It has been pointed
out that logit models tend to overestimate the benefit to consumers of prod-
uct variety (see Petrin (2002)), because each new product introduces a new
dimension of differentiation for which some consumers have a very high id-
iosyncratic taste. This is not the case here: no new dimension of product
differentiation accompanies the introduction of new engine variants, because
for each consumer, new variants have the same idiosyncratic shock as the
baseline variant of the model. The crowding of characteristics space that
results from multi-variant models is therefore taken into account.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies the extent and profitability of price discrimination with
automobile engine variants, by developing and estimating a new empirical
demand model that has the relevant theory models as special cases. The
question of what engine variants to offer if restricting the quality range is re-
lated to the recent product-choice literature, e.g. Mazzeo (2002) and Gram-
lich (2009). I simplify this question by assuming that firms would choose
their current highest-profit engine variant. Further work could look more
closely at the interaction between discrimination and firms’ product choice.
While I focus on approximately vertically differentiated variants, the demand
framework also fits horizontally differentiated variants and package sizes. I
estimate the model on individual level data, but it could also be used for
market level data, as long as a nonzero prediction error could be justified as
sampling error or in another way.
38See Train (2003) p. 266 for how to compute consumer surplus. In my utility specifica-
tion income enters the price coefficient linearly, but disposable income enters only linearly.
Total consumer surplus is computed over all consumers, including those choosing the out-
side good in either case, but these do not experience any change in consumer surplus since
their choice or its attributes do not change.
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